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Huston: Leesville Concrete Co.

EDMONSON v. LEESVILLE CONCRETE COMPANY':
PRE-EMPTING PREJUDICE
Our cultural patterns are an amalgam of black and white. Our destinies
are tied together. There is no separate black path to power and
fulfillment that does not have to intersect with white roots. Somewhere
black and white together, we
along the way the two must join together,
2
shall overcome, and I still believe it.

INTRODUCTION

In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,3 the United States Supreme Court
decided the issue of whether parties in a civil case may use their peremptory
challenges to exclude black venirepersons from the jury.
This Note will discuss the various limitations that courts have placed on the
use of peremptory challenges, and the position of the Supreme Court. This Note will
also discuss the Court's expansion of the state action doctrine, and the impact
Edmonson will have on future cases.
BACKGROUND

The right to a jury trial is found in the Sixth and Seventh Amendments of the
United States Constitution. The trial jury is chosen from a larger group of people
called the venire. The venire necessarily consists of people who represent a fair
cross-section of the community. 4 The trial jury is chosen from the venire through
aprocess called voir dire. During voir dire, parties are permittedto question the venirepersons to determine any biases they might have which would have an effect on
the outcome of the trial. To request that a particular venireperson be excused,
parties may assert either a challenge for cause or a peremptory challenge. A
challenge for cause is "[a] request from a party to a judge that a certain prospective
juror not be allowed to be a member of the jury because of specified causes or
reasons. ' 6 Each party has an unlimited number of challenges for cause.7 A
peremptory challenge is "Itihe right to challenge a juror without assigning ... a
111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991)
SMartin Luther King, Jr., Tha WORDS OF MARn Lnmn

Kmo, JR. Sm.c-r=

By CoRrTA Scam KING 23

(1983).
3 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1861, which disallows excluding a person from jury service on account of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin or economic status. The venire is commonly selected by randomly selecting
names from a list of registered voters in the community.
People v. Wheeler, 22 Ca.3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
'BLACKs LAW DICnoNARY 230 (6th ed. 1990).

28 U.S.C. § 1870.
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reason for the challenge." 8 The number of peremptory challenges allowed usually
varies with the type of case and number of parties involved.
Since the parties are generally not required to articulate a reason for exercising
the peremptory challenge, this method has often been used to exclude blacks from
the jury. 9 This use of the peremptory challenge has been subject to increasing
scrutiny in recent years.
The EqualProtection Guaranteeof the FourteenthAmendment
The primary challenge to the discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge
10
is that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1874, Taylor Strauder, a black man, was convicted of murder by an allwhite jury.11 At the time, a West Virginia statute did not permit black people to
participate on grand or petit juries. 2 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
the opportunity to serve
conviction.1 3 The Court found that denying black people
4
laws.1
the
of
protection
equal
the
them
denied
juries
on
Nearly a century passed before the Court first addressed whether a prosecutor
may use the peremptory challenge to exclude blacks from the jury." Robert Swain,
a black man, was indicted and convicted of rape.1 6 Of the eight blacks on the venire,
two were exempt, and six were peremptorily struck by the prosecutor.' 7 Swain
challenged the exclusion of the black jurors on equal protection grounds.18 The
Supreme Court found no constitutional violation. 19 Tracing the history of the
peremptory challenge, the Court focused on the rationale behind permitting use of
the peremptory challenge. "Since striking ajury allowed both sides a greaternumber
of challenges and an opportunity to become familiar with the entire venire list, it was
deemed an effective means of obtaining more impartial and better qualified
'BL.Acxs LAW DzcnoNmAY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
9 One study concluded that, in criminal cases with black defendants, the government exercised its

peremptory challenges against black venirepersons, three times more often than one would expect. United
States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243, 1244 (E.D. La. 1974).
11Another line of cases has been brought under the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement. This
argument has been successful when determining who should be eligible forjury duty (i.e. who makes up the
venire). See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). However, the Court has refused to find that
the petit jury itself is required to represent a fair cross-section of the community. Holland v. Illinois, 110
S. Ct. 803, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 1514 (1990).
" Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1880).
12Id. at 305.
1Id. at 312.

14
Id. at 308.
" Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
16Id. at 203.
17Id.at 205
l8Id. at 210-11.
19Id. at 221.
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jurors., 20 The Court said that it was not necessary to inquire into the prosecutor's
reasons for excusing a juror through the peremptory challenge. 2' The Court
suggested that to raise a valid claim, "the defendant must... show the prosecutor's
systematic use of peremptory challenges against [blacks] over a period of time. 2
Shortly thereafter, courts began to develop alternative, less restrictive standards to show discrimination on the part of the prosecutor.23 Finally, in 1986, the
Supreme Court overruled the Swain decision in Batson v. Kentucky.24 During the
trial, Batson's prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to exclude all four black
persons from the venire.25 The Supreme Court decided that in a criminal case, where
the defendant is black, the prosecutor may not use peremptory challenges to strike
black jurors from the venire. 26 The decision overruled Swain in that it held that a
defendant could establish a primafacie showing of discrimination based solely on
the facts of his case.27 Under Batson, a defendant can establish aprimafaciecase
of discrimination by proving: "(1) [TIhat he is a member of a cognizable racial
group"; and (2) that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike members
of the venire who are of the same race as the defendant. In addition, the defendant
can rely on facts and other circumstances that
give rise to an inference that the
29
manner.
discriminatory
a
in
acted
prosecutor
The holding in Batson was limited to the prosecutor's discriminatory use of
the peremptory challenge to exclude black venirepersons in a criminal case where
the defendant is black. 0 The basic rationale of Batson was that the public's faith in
the justice system
is harmed when the court permits discrimination to occur under
3
its own roof. '
The most recent expansion of the Batson doctrine in a criminal setting
occurred in Powers v. Ohio.3 2 Powers, a white man, objected when the state used
peremptory challenges to strike seven blacks from the venire.33 The Court held that
a criminal defendant has standing to raise an equal protection claim based on the
20

1d. at 217-18.

2

Id.at 222. In the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant and Catholic, are
alike subject to being challenged without cause. To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case
to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the
nature and operation of the challenge. Id. at 221-22.
22 Id. at 227.
23 See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).

- 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
d.at 83.
2 Id. at 84.
"2
Id. at 96.
25

8

29

Id.

1Id.

30Id.

1,
Id. at 87.
32 111 S.Ct. 1364 (1991).
3 Id. at 1366.
Published
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discriminatory use ofthe peremptory challenge, whetherornot the defendant and the
excluded jurors are of the same race. 34 The Court used a three-part test. First, the
defendant must suffer a cognizable injury as a result of the discriminatory use of the
peremptory challenge, and the defendant must have a "concrete interest" in challenging the practice.3 5 This element was satisfied because the defendant was denied his
right to a neutral jury selection process.3 6 In addition, racial discrimination
undermines the integrity of the judicial system.37 Second, there must be a
relationship between the defendant and the excluded jurors, so that the defendant can
be an effective proponent of the jurors' rights. 38 The Court found this element was
satisfied because of the shared interest in eliminating racial discrimination from the
courtroom. 39 Third, it should be unlikely that the injured party will raise the claim
on his or her own behalf.40 This requirement was satisfied as well. 41 The Court
found inconsequential the fact that the jurors and the defendant were of different
42
races.
Civil Application of Batson and the State Action Problem
Courts have split on the issue of whether the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges by private parties in civil cases violates equal protection. 4 3 At least one
court has held that the interest of a civil litigant is sufficiently different from a
criminal defendant's interest to justify permitting discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge in a civil case. 4 ' However, the
majority of the controversy surrounds
45
the issue of whether there is "state action."
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[n]o State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.",46 The Supreme Court has held that restrictions imposed on the federal
government through the Fifth Amendment are imposed in equal force upon the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 However, the Fourteenth Amendment does
34 Id.

36

at 1373.
IId. at 1370
Id. at 1371.

37 Id.

3

1Id. at 1372.

39 Id.

40 Id. at 1370.
41

ld. at 1372-73. The Court felt that ajuror would be intimidated at bringing a suit. Factors the Court cited
included difficulty in showing repeated discrimination, the expense of trial, and the small financial stake
involved. Id. at 1373.
42 Id.
43
See generally,Note, The Civil Implications ofBatson v. Kentucky and State v. Gilmore: A FurtherLook
at Limitationson the Peremptory Challenge, 40 RuTrERs L. REV. 891 (1988).
4Esposito v. Bunome, 642 F. Supp 760, 761 (D. Conn. 1986).
43 "State action" is a term of art used to describe involvement on the part of the federal, state, or local
government.
46
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4' Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/7
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443

not apply directly to private citizens. The invocation of equal protection rights
necessarily requires the finding of state action.
The Supreme Court has developed several basic theories for finding state
action.4s One theory is based on a "symbolic relationship" 49 between the state and
a private actor. In Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority,50 Burton, a black man,
was denied service in the Eagle, a privately owned restaurant.5 1 The Court found a
symbolic relationship between the Eagle and the State because the Eagle was 5located
2
in a building owned by the Wilmington Parking Authority, a state agency.
State action may also be found if there is a "sufficiently close nexus" between
the state and the challenged activity. 53 This argument usually arises when the
challenged activity is supported by a state statute.
In a few cases, the Supreme Court has determined that activities undertaken
by private individuals are activities that are traditionally undertaken by the state. 4
In Marsh v. Alabama,55 a private corporation owned a town.5 6 Marsh, a Jehovah's
Witness, was convicted of trespassing.5 7 The Supreme Court reversed the convicfinding that the town's privately owned streets
tion on equal protection grounds,
58
were, in effect, a public place.
A fourth method for invoking the state action doctrine is the "joint action"
theory. Under this theory, private entities acting jointly with public officials create
state action. In Lugarv. Edmonson Oil Company, 59 the Supreme Court developed
a two-part test for determining state action:
(1) [t]he deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or
See Schwartz, State Action: Revival or One Night Stand?, N.Y.L., Aug. 20, 1991, at 3, col. 1.
49

Id.

-0365 U.S. 715 (1961).
1d. at 716.
-2Id. at 725. Subsequent cases have interpreted Burton very narrowly, distinguishing it on the grounds that
the state profited from the private racial discrimination (i.e. that the Eagle leased property from the state
agency, and that the Eagle's business would have been injured if blacks had been served).
s3But cf.Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (warehouseman's sale of goods entrusted to him
for storage does not constitute state action just because it is permitted by state statute). See also Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (state licensing of a private club does not create state action
sufficient to raise a Fourteenth Amendment claim).
4To decide the peremptory challenge issue under this theory, the court must decide whether the peremptory
challenge process is a traditional state function.
-$326 U.S. 501 (1946).
51

-6Id. at 502.
Slid. at 503-04.

at 506. Other activities considered to be public functions include: the maintenance of parks, Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) and regulating the election of public officials, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944). But see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (administration of nursing homes is not state
action).
58d.

457

922 (1982).
PublishedU.S.
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
State or by a person for whom the State is responsible;W [and] (2) the
party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be
said to be a state actor..[either] because he is a state official, because
he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state
officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State. 6 '
With the exception of one case, 62 the determination of whetherBatson applies
to civil cases has turned on whether there was state action. More specifically, the
controversy centers around whether the second part of the Lugar test is satisfied.
That is, whether there is a cognizable state actor. 63 The courts are generally in
agreement that whenever state action is present, then the rationale of Batson applies
in equal force to civil cases. 64
In ruling on a due process claim, the Supreme Court held that apublic defender
does not become a state actor when representing an indigent defendant in a criminal
proceeding. 65 The Court determined that the services of a defense lawyer are
"essentially a private function." 66 The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on this case when
deciding Edmonson v. Leesville ConcreteCo.67 The appellate court determined that
private litigants in civil cases are not state actors and therefore Batson did not
apply."
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit took a different approach. In Fludd
v. Dykes ,69 the Eleventh Circuit held that Batson applied to civil cases. 70 The Fludd
court emphasized that it is the trial judge who makes a decision "to proceed to trial,
over the party's objection" based on the discriminatory use of the peremptory
challenge. 7 1 Therefore, the trial judge himself becomes the state actor.7 2
Critics argue that the Fludd court's approach may be too broad.7

Their

60 Id. at 937.
61 Id.

2See Esposito v. Buobome, 642 F. Supp 760 (D. Conn. 1986).
'3 The first part of the Lugar test in not really an issue in these cases. The right to use peremptory challenges
is usually granted by statute. Therefore, it can fairly be considered a right or privilege created by the state.
"See Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990). See also Clark v. City of Bridgeport,
645 F. Supp. 890(D. Conn. 1986). In both of these cases, state action was not an issue because city attorneys
were involved in the litigation.
I Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981). This is because of the adverse relationship between
a public defender and the state. Id. at 320.

6Id. at 318-19.
67 895 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
" Id.
69
863 F.2d 822 (1lth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 201 (1989).
70
ld. at 829.
71 Id. at 828.
72Id.
71See, e.g., Equal Protection - Jury Selection - Eleventh Circuit Restricts the Discriminatory Use of
Peremptory Challengesin Civil Litigation - Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989), 103 HARv. L.

REv. 586, 589-90 (1989).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/7
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primary concern is the possible effect this application will have on criminal
defendants. "By finding state action in the judge's decision to proceed to trial, Fludd

may implicitly require the courtroom actions of any attorney -including the74defense
attorney in a criminal case - to conform to the Equal Protection Clause.,
STATEMENT OF TnE CASE
The Decision of the Trial Court
Plaintiff-appellant, Thaddeus Donald Edmonson was employed as a construction worker with the defendant-appellee, Leesville Concrete Company.75 Edmonson sued-Leesville, claiming that a Leesville employee negligently allowed one of
the company's
trucks to roll backwards and pin him against construction equip76
ment.
Of the originally impaneled venire, three members belonged to the black
race.77 During voir dire, Leesville used two of its three peremptory challenges
authorized by statute 78to remove blacks from the prospective jury. 79 Relying on the

United States Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky,80 Edmonson requested that Leesville be required to state race-neutral reasons for excising the
jurors. 81 The district court denied this request.82 The court determined that Batson
was not binding on civil cases.8 3
4
The impaneled jury consisted of eleven white persons and one black person.8
85
The jury found in favor of Edmonson. The jury valued total damages at $90,000.86
However, the jury attributed 80% of the fault to Edmonson's contributory negligence, leaving him with an award of $18,000.87

The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Edmonson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. A divided panel reversed the decision of the district court, holding that
74

Id. at 590.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2081 (1991).
76Id. at 2080.
Id. Edmonson is also a member of the black race.
28 U.S.C. § 1870 states: "In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges...Anl
challenges for cause or favor whether to the array or panel orto individual jurors shall be determined by the
court."
79111 S.Ct. at 2081.
75

80 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986).
"1 111 S.Ct. at 2081.
2
1Id.
83Id.
84Id.

83 Id.
86 Id.

Id.
Published
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private litigants in civil cases may not use the peremptory challenges to exclude
jurors on the basis of race.8 8 Following the spirit of Batson, the court found that
prejudicial use of the peremptory challenge violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 89 The panel found that "[t]he government is intimately
involved in the process by which a litigant challenges a prospective juror." 90 The
court emphasized that it is the judge, a government official, who excuses the
prospective juror. 91 The panel remanded the case to the trial court for the determination on whether Edmonson had established a primafacie case of discrimination
as mandated under Batson.9 2
The full court then held a rehearing en banc. A divided panel affirmed the
district court' s judgment. 93 The court held that private litigants did not become state
actors by exercising their peremptory challenges, and therefore, the Fourteenth
Amendmentwas not applicable. 94 Edmonson appealed again, and the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 9 5
The Decision of the Supreme Court
1. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court held that Batson applies to private citizens in civil cases,
and therefore, peremptory challenges may not be used in civil cases to exclude jurors
on the basis of race. 96 The Court applied the two-part test from Lugar v. Edmonson
Oil Company 9 7 and determined that the plaintiff had satisfied the requirements. The
Court gave the first part of the Lugar test98 only cursory attention: "[P]eremptory
challenges have no significance outside a court of law ...[They] are permitted only
when the government, by statute or decisional law, deems it appropriate to allow
parties to exclude a given number of persons who otherwise would satisfy the
requirements for service ...."99
The majority of the Court's opinion focused on the second part of the Lugar
test.l°° The Court employed three different theories to make this determination: "the

"SEdmonson

v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1315 (5th Cir. 1988).

89Id.
9

0ld. at 1312

91Id.
92Id. at 1315.

9'Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F. 2d 218, 226 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
94Id.

ll S. Ct. 41 (1990).
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991).
91457 U.S. at 937.
9
Whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right of privilege having
its source in state authority. Id.
9

9'

" 111 S.Ct. at 2083.

101 Whether the private party charged with the deprivation
941-42.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/7
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extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits.. .; whether
the actor is performing a traditional government function.. .; whether the injury
10
caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority." '
Noting again that peremptory challenges have no utility outside the jury
system, the Court found that exercise of the peremptory challenge requires the overt
significant assistance of the court.'2 The Court also found that Leesville performed
a traditional state function in exercising its peremptory challenges.1 0 3 The peremptory challenge is used in jury selection. The jury system "performs the critical
government functions of guarding the right of litigants and insuring continued
acceptance of the laws by all of the people."'' 4 The Court specifically distinguished
Polk County v. Dodson.10 5 Although there is an employment relationship between
the government and a public defender, the relationship is adversarial in nature. This
adversarial relationship does not exist between the government and a private
and private litigants
litigant.1°6 The Court found it significant that the government
07
work toward the same goal during the jury selection. 1
Finally, the Courtemphasized that the injury caused by discrimination is made
worse because the government permits it to happen.108 "Race discrimination within
the courtroom raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings
conducted there .... To permit racial exclusion in this official forum compounds
1 °9
the racial insult inherent in judging a citizen by the color of his or her skin."
In addition to holding that a juror's equal protection rights could be violated
through a private litigant's use of the peremptory challenge, the Court also found that
a private civil litigant has standing to raise the equal protection claim on behalf of
the juror. 1 0 The Court found the analysis in Powersapplied to civil trials as well." 1
The Supreme Court reversed the case, and remanded for a determination of
whether Edmonson can establish a primafaciecase of racial discrimination.

101111 S. Ct. at 2083 (citations omitted).
0 2
1 The Court determined that it is thej udge, unarguably a state actor, whose enforcement of the peremptory
challenge gives it effect. Id. at 2084.
103 Id. at 2085.
1
04 Id., quoting Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1369 (1991).
oS 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
,06 111 S. Ct. at 2086.
107 Id.
108Id. at 2087.
19 Id.
1l0 Id.
"I Id. It is curious that the court found it necessary to make this determination. Edmonson himself was
black, and could have raised his own equal protection claim. In Powers, the Court held a white litigant has
standing to raise an equal protection claim on behalf of an excluded black juror. The implication of this
application of Powers will be discussed later.
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2. The Dissenting Opinions
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice O'Connor took issue with several parts of the majority's decision. First,
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's determination that a private litigant
acts with the overt, significant participation of the government. While the Court
referred to government involvement in the jury selection process,' 12 Justice O'Connor pointed out that the court would do these things whether there was a peremptory
challenge or not.113 Justice O'Connor admitted that the judge who excuses a
challenged juror is a state actor. However, Justice O'Connor believed that this type
of government participation is insufficient to qualify as state action. 114 Justice
this case was more comparable to Jackson v. Metropolitan
O'Connor believed
15
Co..
Edison
Justice O'Connor also disagreed with the Court's holding that the exercise of
the peremptory challenge is a traditional government function. Justice O'Connor
found it significant that "[pleremptory challenges are exercised by a party, not in
selection of jurors, but in rejection."' "16 In addition, when tracing the history of the
peremptory challenge, Justice O'Connor pointed out that it is "older than the
Republic,"1 7 thus demonstrating that it has never been the exclusive function of the
government to select juries. 118
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia addressed the problematic
implications of this decision. Justice Scalia's concerns were two-fold. First, he was
wary that this case logically extends to criminal defendants." 9 Justice Scalia also
believed that the case will lead to more litigation because every time an equal
protection claim is raised, another trial will be0 required to determine whether there
is a primafacie showing of discrimination.12

112
Id. at 2084.
113111 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (1991)(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
114Id.
" 3 1d. at 2091. In Jackson,419 U.S. 345 (1974), the plaintiff claimed that he was denied due process when
his electric company cut off service pursuant to a procedure approved of by the state utility commission. Id.
at 348. The Court denied this claim, holding that state approval of the plan did not rise to the level of state
encouragement. Id. at 358.
116 111 S. Ct. at 2092 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Lincoln, Abbott's Civil Jury Trials 92 (3d
ed. 1912), quoting O'Neil v Lake Superior Iron Co., 67 Mich. 560, 35 N.W. 162 (1887)).
111 S. Ct. at 2093.
1]5
Id.
19 Id. at 2095 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia's fears were realized a year later when, in Georgia v.
McCollum, 60 U.S.LW. 4574 (1992), the Court applied Edmonson to find that a criminal defendant does
not have the right to exercise his peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. For a
of McCollum, see Addendum.
discussion
20
' Id. at 2096.
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ANALYSIS

Expanding the State Action Doctrine
The Supreme Court has set out on a noble mission: to eradicate discrimination
from the judicial process. However, the Court must work within the bounds of the
United States Constitution and precedential decisions. In deciding Edmonson, the
Court stretched these boundaries, and on occasion, came very near to crossing them.
The Court's holding that private litigants in a civil case become state actors
when they exercise peremptory challenges, rested on the application of three state
action theories: the extent of government participation; the traditional government
function doctrine;
and the unique injury caused by government endorsement of
1 21
discrimination.

1. The Extent of Government Participation
The Court found that the peremptory challenge is exercised only with "the
overt, significant participation of the government." 122 The involvement of the
1 23
government inthe entirejury selection is, indeed, significant.m
However, as Justice
O'Connor wrote in dissent, these activities would occur whether or not there was a
peremptory challenge.'14 Surely the Court did not mean to imply that state action
results simply from the summoning of a jury. If this were so, then every jury trial
would trigger state action.
The Court found that state action results because the trial judge himself
excuses the challenged venireperson from the panel.1 25 The Court claimed that when
the judge discharges a juror who has been challenged for discriminatory reasons, the
government "in a significant way has involved itself with invidious discrimination."' 26 This is not really a significant involvement on the part of the government.
The Court cites Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority 127for the proposition that
the government "has not only made itself a party to the [biased act], but has elected
to place its power, property, and prestige behind the [alleged discrimination]." 28
However, the Court reached a different conclusion in Jackson v. Metropolitan
21

12

Id. at 2083.
Id. at 2084.

The Court lists this involvement: establishing qualification for jury service, determining which jurors
will be summoned, payment of theper diem,jury qualification forms, etc. Much of this activity is mandated
by statute. Id.
"2Jd. at 2090 (O'Connor, ., dissenting).
WId. at 2084.
'12Id. at 2085.
127 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
2

12s Id. at 725. The Court also cites Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shelley, the State was found to
have "exercised coercive force" to enforce discriminatory restrictive covenants between private property
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Edison Co.129 In that case, Jackson's electrical services were terminated pursuant
to a procedure approved by the state utility commission. The Supreme Court held
that Jackson could not raise a due process claim because the State did not encourage
the termination. 130 Similarly, the trial judge does not encourage alitigant's discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge, nor does the Court use coercive force to
enforce discrimination. The judge simply instructs the juror that he or she has been
excused. Jackson is more applicable to the situation in Edmnonson - especially
considering the Court's reluctance in previous cases to interpret Burton in a broad
manner.
2. The Traditional Government Function Doctrine
The Court did not rely solely on the government's overt, significant participation to find state action. The Court also applied the public function theory in
finding that the peremptory challenge is used "in selecting an entity that is a
131
quintessential government body."
The Court may define the government function involved in this case either
broadly or narrowly. The majority used the broad function of selecting jurors.
However, the dissent used the narrow function of exercising peremptory challenges.
Defining this function is critical. The jury selection process, as a whole, may fairly
be considered a government function. Nonetheless, the exercise of peremptory
challenges is not necessarily a traditional government function. The peremptory
challenge is used to exclude potential jurors - not select them. 132 In addition, the
peremptory challenge has its roots in ancient history, 133thus demonstrating that the
peremptory challenge is not a traditional government function.
Even if the exercise of peremptory challenges could be considered a traditional
government function, it does not meet the exclusive government function test stated
in FlaggBrothersv. Brooks.1 34 The practice of peremptory challenges precedes the
Republic,135 and therefore cannot be considered an exclusive function ofthe government.
3. The Unique Injury Caused by Governmental Endorsement
of Discrimination
As discussed above, the first two theories put forth by the Supreme Court are
insufficient for a finding of state action. If there is any justification for the Court's
419 U.S. 345 (1974).
Id. at 357.
3 111 S.Ct. at 2085.
2

129
3 0

1

1"Id. at 2092 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
3
13 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218 (1965).
134
3 See

436 U.S. at 159-60.

1 3 111 S. Ct. at 2093.
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decision, it is the third factor cited by the Court. Governmental endorsement of the
discriminatory use ofthe peremptory challenge poses a special problem. Public faith
in the fairness of the judicial system is essential. Permitting discrimination in this
forum tends to undermine faith in the system.' 36 Even in dissent, Justice Scalia
recognized the value of this decision. "Although today's decision neitherfollows the
law nor produces desirable concrete results, it certainly has great symbolic value. To
overhaul the doctrine of state action in this fashion - what a magnificent demonstrauncompromising hostility to race-based judgments, even by
tion of this institution's
137
actors!'
private
138

The Application of Edmonson to CriminalDefendants

The Edmonson Court did not expressly address whether criminal defense
attorneys are also restricted in their use of peremptory challenges. This particular
issue raises difficult questions, and the Court was correct to refrain from addressing
this issue. 139 Among the questions raised by this issue are whether Batson is
consistent with the Fifth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to remain silent,
and the Sixth Amendment right to effectiveness of counsel.' 40 There are different
factors that are unique to criminal trials and were not present in this case. These
include (1) the different burdens of proof for civil and criminal trials, (2) the different
roles of the defense counsel and the prosecutor
in a criminal trial; and (3) the different
41
trial.1
criminal
a
in
involved
punishment
The Court's decision sent a conflicting message about how it will resolve this
issue in the future. 142 As Batson held, the Court's rationale of harm to the judicial
system, resulting from racial discrimination in the courtroom, applies with equal
force to a criminal proceeding. Another factor indicating that the Court intends for
43
Batson to apply to criminal defendants is the Court's reference to Powersv. Ohio.
Under Powersthe equal protection claim raised in Edmonson was that of the juror,
not Edmonson. If the equal protection claim belongs to the juror, as Powers and
Edmonson held, then the Batson rule could apply equally to both sides of a criminal
case. However, if the State's discrimination violates the rights ofthe defendant, then
Batson should not apply to a State's challenge of the defendant's peremptory
strikes. 144 The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is a right belonging
136 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
137 Ill S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

'3' This Note was written before the Court decided this issue in Georgia v. McCollum, 60 U.S.L.W. 4574
(1992). For a discussion of McCollum, see Addendum.
139

See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in support of the Petitioner, Edmonson

v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2076 (1991 ) (No. 89-7743).
140 Id.

141Id. at 19.
142 The Court has agreed to resolve this issue next term in Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 931 (1991).
'4 111 S. Ct. at 2088. Powers held that a white criminal defendant has standing to raise an excluded black
juror's constitutional claim.
1
See supra note 73 at 590, "Compare Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-87 (suggesting that a defendant's right to
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to the individual. There is no such right belonging to the state.
The policy reasons behind the Edmonson Court's decision, and the Court's
reference to Powers indicate that a criminal defendant will not be permitted to use
peremptory challenges to discriminate on his own behalf. However, the manner in
which the Court distinguished Polk County v. Dodson,14 5 leads to a different conclusion. The Edmonson Court distinguished Polk County on the grounds that the
public defender is not a state actor because his private function is as an adversary to
the government.'46 Similarly, a criminal defense attorney acts as an adversary to the
government. Therefore, "[tlhe Court must concede that Polk County stands for the
defense attorney is not a state actor when using
proposition that a criminal
147
peremptory strikes.

The Court's decision is internally inconsistent. It will be interesting to see
how the Court resolves this issue in the future.
The Tip of the Iceberg
Aside from the application to criminal defendants problem, the Edmonson
decision gives rise to several other questions. The case only addresses peremptory
challenges based on race. It seems that the Court's interest in eliminating
discrimination from the judicial process would logically extend to challenges on the
basis of gender, national origin, age, handicap, economic background, etc.1'4 This
is at odds with the rationale behind the peremptory challenge - to allow parties to
strike venirepersons for any reason, or no reason at all.
If a Batson/Edmonson challenge is made, a separate trial will be required to
determine whether the complainant can make a primafacieshowing of discrimination. Not only will this add to the docket of an already overloaded court, but it creates
a prime opportunity for a party to delay the trial.
Another disturbing result may follow if the court does find a prima facie
showing of discrimination. It seems reasonable to conclude that the striking party,
if shown to have used to peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner, could be
subject to Civil Rights litigation. Certainly parties are going to be hesitant to employ
the peremptory challenge if a Civil Rights charge could result.
equal protection is violated if members of his race have been purposefully excluded from the jury) with Id.
at 87,97-98 (finding that racial discrimination injury selection 'unconstitutionally discriminates against the
excluded juror')."
145 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (The Court held that a public defender is not a state actor).
146111
147

S. Ct. at 2086.
Id. at 2094 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).

'4'
See,e.g., Dias v. Sky Chefs, 919 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1990). The plaintiff in asexual harassment suit, used
peremptory challenges to strike three men from the venire - leaving an all female jury. Id. at 1377. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and remanded the case to the court of appeals for further consideration
in light of Edmonson. 111 S.Ct. 2791 (1991).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/7
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CONCLUSION

In Edmonson v. Leesville ConcreteCompany, 149the Supreme Court held that
a private civil litigant may not use the peremptory challenge to exclude blacks from
the venire. In doing so, the Court stretched the bounds of the state action doctrine.
Left unanswered is the issue of whether Batson applies to criminal defendants.
The Court should be commended for its effort to eradicate discrimination from
the judicial process. However, by expanding the state action doctrine in this way,
the Court has created more problems than it resolved. The peremptory challenge is
supposed to be a means in which a party can exclude jurors for any reason, or no
reason at all. It evolved as a method of ensuring that the jury will be fair and
impartial. A party is no longer free to exercise his peremptory challenges in any way
he chooses. Inability to articulate a reason for striking a juror will result in at least
one additional trial, and maybe more. The death knell has sounded for peremptory
challenges.
ANDREA

149 111

S. Ct. 2077.
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